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Apparent Authority and Healthcare in Illinois
MARC D. GINSBERG*

INTRODUCTION

he intersection of medical negligence and apparent authority in
Illinois is undeniable. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court of
Illinois utilized apparent authority in Gilbert v. Sycamore
Municipal Hospital' and Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc. 2 to
hold a hospital and an HMO, respectively, vicariously liable for non-agent
or non-servant agent physician negligence.
Gilbert3 and Petrovich4 are significant public policy statements by the
Supreme Court of Illinois. Hospitals and HMOs which hold out physicians
as extensions of the hospital or HMO "family" and which advertise "their
physicians" to consumers (patients and potential patients) may be
answerable for the medical negligence committed in the hospital or within
the HMO setting.5 The economic benefits derived by hospitals and HMOs
from the competitive6 healthcare market come with the detriment of
vicarious tort liability.
The problem with Gilbert7 and Petrovich8 is not so much with the
policy statement as with the effort by the Supreme Court of Illinois to

* Marc Ginsberg is a partner with Rooks, Pitts and Poust in Chicago, Illinois,
where he primarily represents physicians. He earned his B.A., with Honors, from the
University of Illinois (Chicago), his M.A. from Indiana University, his J.D., with Highest
Distinction, from The John Marshall Law School (Chicago), and his LL.M. in Health Law
from the DePaul University College of Law. He is also an Adjunct Professor of law at The
John Marshall Law School. The author acknowledges Janice Ginsberg, his wife, for her
inspiration and support, and also acknowledges Professor Michael Closen of The John
Marshall Law School (Chicago) for his encouragement and editorial assistance. The views
expressed in this article are solely those of the author and not of the law firm of Rooks, Pitts
and Poust, or its clients.
1. 622 N.E.2d 788 (Il. 1993).
719 N.E.2d 756 (Il. 1999).
2.
622 N.E.2d 788 (Il1. 1993).
3.
719 N.E.2d 756 (Il1. 1993).
4.
5. 622 N.E.2d at 795; 719 N.E.2d at 775.
It should be noted that HMOs may be subject to a direct negligence claim,
6.
known as institutional negligence. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119 (I11.
2000). For many years, hospitals have been subject to institutional negligence claims.
Darling v. Charleston Cmty Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (I1l. 1965).
7.
622 N.E.2d 788.
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ground these decisions in classical agency law. This effort is simply
misplaced. The agency concepts of principal-agent and master-servant
(with respondeat superior) do not fit healthcare related negligence. An
examination of these fundamental agency principles reveals that the
Supreme Court has incorrectly applied the law rather than asserting policy
reasons for not following the law at all.
I. BACK TO BASICS
The doctrine of respondeat superior is well known to agency law. It
provides that a master principal (employer) is liable for the negligence
committed by a servant agent within the course and scope of the servant's
employment. 9 The master is without fault.' ° The master's liability is
predicated on the negligence of the servant."' Essentially, the employer is
required to anticipate that certain employees will commit negligent acts in
12
carrying out the business of the employer.
Respondeat superior applies in the master-servant setting. 13 This
setting does not comprise every principal-agent relationship. Therefore, it
is necessary to distinguish servant agents from non-servant agents. The
14
most prominent factor used to evaluate the type of agency is "control.'
Masters retain the right to control servants.' 5 Furthermore, servants tend to
be less skilled than non-servant agents, utilize less expertise than nonservant agents, tend to exercise little or no discretion in their work and are
not compensated by the job.' 6 A ents who are not servants may be
regarded as independent contractors.
Independent contractor agents are
employed by principals, but they are not subject to the right of control' 8 and
19
their negligent torts are not imputed to their principals.

8.
9.
REUSCHLEIN

719 N.E.2d 756.
See WARREN SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY Ch. 6, § 83-84 (1964); HAROLD GILL
&

WILLIAM

A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND

PARTNERSHIP Ch. 5, § 52 (2d ed. 1990); Montgomery v. Petty Mgmt. Corp., 752 N.E.2d
596, 598 (I11. App. Ct. 2001).
10.
FLOYD R. MECHEM, LAW OF AGENCY Ch. V, § 1856 (2d ed. 1903).
11.
Id. at § 1857.
12.
Id. at § 1856.
13.
Id. at§ 1858.
14.
See id. at § 1856.
15.
SEAVEY, supra note 9, Ch. 6 § 84.
16.
Id.
17.
MECHUM, supra note 10, Ch. V § 1870.
18.
Hartley v. Red Ball Transit Co., 176 N.E. 751 (I11. 1931).
19.
Id.
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The distinction between servant agents and non-servant agents is
crucial to the application of respondeat superior. It is also crucial to an
understanding of agency law in the healthcare setting.
II. THE HOSPITAL

Hospitals employ an array of agents - some are professionals and
some are not. Hospital employed physicians, nurses and technicians are
highly skilled employees. Obviously, hospitals employ many other lesser-

skilled, non-professional employees.

Most physicians who practice

medicine on hospital premises are not employed by the hospital. 20 These
are on-staff physicians who have privileges to admit patients to and treat22
2
patients at the hospital. ' These physicians are not paid by the hospital.
They are not salaried by the hospital and receive no other stipend from the
hospital.23 They are not agents of the hospital. How, then, is the
negligence of a non-agent physician imputed to a hospital in Illinois? Is it
through the application of the doctrines of "apparent authority" and
respondeat superiordespite the tortured use of the doctrines?
III. THE HMO

The health maintenance organization (HMO) is a type of managed
care organization (MCO). 24

The HMO described in Petrovich25 is an

individual practice association (IPA) model. A physicians group can
contract with an HMO to provide health care for enrollees for a set fee,
paid in advance.26 The individual physicians are not compensated by the
HMO.27

See FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, Ch. 7, §
20.
1 (1997) ("A physician or other health care professional may treat patients in a particular
hospital only if the practitioner has "privileges" at that hospital. The hospital does not pay a
fee or salary to a health care professional who only holds privileges and who has no other
relationship (such as employment, a contract for services or a joint business venture) with
the hospital."). Id. at 455.
See SMITH, J., HOSPITAL LIABILITY, Ch. 1, § 1.03 (Law Journal Press 2001).
21.
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 20.
22.
Id.
23.
Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 763.
24.
25.
719 N.E.2d 756.
26.
See Integrated Healthcare Ass'n, Managed Health Care-A Brief Glossary, at
http://www.iha.org/gloss.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
Id.
27.
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This type of financial arrangement, the capitation fee, provides the
HMO with power over physicians.28 It has been argued that MCOs control
the supply of insured patients, create incentives to undertreat enrollees and
encourage physicians to limit services, intensive care and referrals to
specialists. 29 The idea is that control over physicians will help to maximize
profits.3 ° As with hospitals, HMOs may be vicariously liable for the
negligence of non-agent physicians through the application of apparent
31
authority and respondeat superior.

28.
Eleanor D. Kinney, Tapping andResolving Consumer ConcernsAbout Health
Care, 26 AM. L. & MED. 335, 337 (2000).
29.
Id. at 338.
30.
Id. at 337-38.
31.
622 N.E.2d at 795; 719 N.E.2d at 775.
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IV. APPARENT AUTHORITY
Apparent authority classically and most frequently applies to the
commercial side of agency. 32 The scenario is simplistically diagrammed as
follows:

(P) Principal

Reliance &
Enforcement
Actual
(Authority)
Holds Out
Agent in. Commerce

Unauthorized Contract

(A)
Agent

TP
(Third
Party)

_

The principal employs the agent and grants the agent authority to enter
into certain transactions on behalf of the principal.33 The authorized
transaction of the agent binds the principal.34 The unauthorized transaction
does not, unless the principal has held the agent out to third parties as if the
agent has authority and the third party reasonably relies upon the holding
out of the agent in commerce."

supra note 10, Ch. I § 724.
supra note 10, Ch. IV §§ 128-29.
REUSCHLIN & GREGORY, supra note 9, Ch. 9 § 95.
See Kasselder v. Kapperman, 316 N.W.2d 628 (S.D. 1982).
MECHEM,
MECHEM,
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Therefore, apparent authority is a doctrine which classically allows a third
party to enforce an unauthorized contract against the principal.36
In -the commercial context, apparent authority seems sensible. It is an
approach which requires a principal to bear the risk of loss of an agent
entering into unauthorized transactions on behalf of the principal with third
parties who cannot know the extent of an agent's authority, and who can
rely on the indicia of authority "communicated" by the principal - i.e., the
"holding out."
A simple example illustrates the point: P employs A as a buyer of
goods. A is expressly authorized by P to spend no more than $500 per
purchase. If A purchases $600 of goods from the seller, the contract is
unauthorized and P is not responsible to the seller for $100 of the purchase
price. To the extent the agent has exceeded the authority granted by the
principal, the agent is responsible to the seller as if the agent entered into
the contract on his own behalf,37 unless the seller can prove that the
principal held out the agent to the seller as if the agent had the requisite
authority to enter into the transaction and the seller could reasonably rely
on the holding out. The reliance might be proved by a history or course of
dealings between the agent and seller. If apparent authority is proven, the
seller can enforce the unauthorized contract against the buyer's principal.
This is the theory. How did this theory come to apply to the healthcarenegligence context in Illinois?
Is the application appropriate or
disingenuous? The 38answers are found by examining Gilbert v. Sycamore
MunicipalHospital.
V. THE MARRIAGE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY AND HEALTHCARE

The facts of Gilbert3 9 are straightforward. Sycamore Municipal
Hospital was served by on-staff physicians, one of whom was Dr. Frank.4 °
The hospital did not salary these physicians and did not pay their business
expenses, social security taxes or provide them with insurance, vacations or
sick leave. 41 Dr. Frank, as did typical on-staff physicians, set his fees,

36.
See GARY S. ROSIN & MICHAEL L. CLOSEN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, Ch. 5, 24 1, n. l (2000) (noting that "[a]pparent authority is

the basic doctrine used by the Restatement to allocate the risk of an unauthorized transaction
entered into by an agent.").
37. REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 9, Ch. 11, § 119.
38. 622 N.E.2d 788 (Il. 1993).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 79 1.
41.
Id. at 791.
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for his services.42 In
determined his schedule and salary, and billed patients
43
short, Dr. Frank was not an agent of the hospital.
Jack Gilbert, the patient, arrived at the hospital emergency room one
afternoon. 44 He signed a consent for emergency treatment indicating that
he would be treated "by physicians and employees of the hospital. ' 45
The emergency room telephoned Dr. Frank who arrived shortly
thereafter, tested Gilbert for heart problems, found none, prescribed pain
medication and discharged him.46 Later that evening, Gilbert died of a
myocardial infarction. 47 An autopsy revealed the presence of heart
disease. 8
The special administrator of the estate sued Dr. Frank and the
hospital. 4 9 The claim against the hospital was based upon the alleged
negligence of its "agents or employees," including Dr. Frank. 0 The
hospital was granted summary judgment and the judgment was upheld by
the appellate court.5'
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and remanded the judgment of
the appellate court, holding that: "[U]nder the doctrine of apparent
authority, a hospital can be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the
or should
physician is an independent contractor,unless the patient knows,
52
contractor.
independent
an
is
physician
the
that
known,
have
By referring to the prior discussion of the two types of agents for tort
purposes - the servant agent and the independent contractor agent - it is
noteworthy that the Supreme Court has misused the "independent

contractor" label.53 Dr. Frank was an on-staff physician.5" He was neither

42.

Id.

Interestingly, the court noted the hospital's consideration of its active staff
43.
physicians as independent contractors. Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 791. I consider this a

mischaracterization. The hospital did not pay Dr. Frank a salary or compensate him in any
respect. Id. Independent contractors are paid non-servant agents. SEAVY, supra note 9, Ch. I

§ 6. Dr. Frank was not an agent at all. Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 791.
Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 791.
44.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 791-92.
47. Id. at 792.
48. Id.
Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 792.
49.
50. Id.
51.
Gilbert v. Frank, 599 N.E.2d 143 (Il. App. Ct. 1992).
Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 795 (Il. 1993) (emphasis
52.
added).
See id.
53.
54. Id. at 791.

HeinOnline -- 22 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 481 2001-2002

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 22-3

a servant agent nor an independent contractor agent. He was not paid by
the hospital.55 Independent contractors are paid for their services. Simply
stated, Dr. Frank, whose negligence could be imputed to the hospital, was
not an agent of the hospital at all.
The supreme court then pronounced the elements of the action based
upon apparent authority:
- The hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would
lead a reasonable person to conclude that the allegedly
negligent physician was an employee or agent of the
hospital;
- the acts of the physician created the appearance of
authority;
- the plaintiff must prove that the hospital had knowledge
of and acquiesced in those acts, and
- the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or its agent.56
The "holding out" element under Gilbert is satisfied if the hospital
holds itself out as a provider of emergency care without informing a patient
that the care is provided by a non-agent. 57 The justifiable reliance element
under Gilbert is satisfied if the patient relies on the hospital to provide
complete emergency care instead of relying on a particular physician to
provide care. This element carries its own significant features and will be
revisited later in this article.
The
Gilbert court
discussed
the pre-Gilbert apparent
authority/healthcare history in Illinois.59 In Sztorc v. Northwest Hospital,
the court considered a claim that the staff members of a hospital's
radiology department were apparent agents of the hospital in a negligence
6
context. 6° The department was actually staffed by a radiology group. '
The radiologists had staff privileges but were not hospital employees.62
The radiology department doors display the names of the radiologists.6 3

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
See id. at 795.
Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 796.
Id.
See id.
496 N.E.2d 1200, 1201-02 (I11.App. Ct. 1986).
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1201.
Id.
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There was no method by which patients or the public could differentiate
employees of the radiology group from employees of the hospital. 64 The
court referred to non-Illinois apparent authority cases and the plaintiff's
testimony which indicated that she did not know if the "independence" of
the radiologists would have made any difference to her.65 The court held
that a question of fact existed as to plaintiffs reliance on a holding out by
the hospital and that there may be a basis in evidence for finding the
hospital liable under apparent authority.66
In Greene v. Rogers,67 decided shortly after Sztorc, the court held that
an emergency room physician, employed by a group which contracted with
a hospital, was not a servant agent of the hospital.6 8 The court refused to
apply apparent authority in the healthcare context, noting that this doctrine
is thought to be a contract theory. 69 The court would not recognize an
exception to this usage.7 °
In Johnson v. Sumner, another emergency physician case, the court
followed its decision in Greene.71 It would not impute physician liability to
the hospital in the absence of an express agency relationship between the
hospital and the physician.72 The court was concerned that the application
of apparent authority would fail to recognize that physicians, not hospitals,
direct the care of patients.7 3 The court was also concerned that apparent
authority would not promote tort law policy which requires the tortfeasor to
be financially responsible for his or her negligence.74
In Northern Trust Co. v. St. FrancisHospital, the court considered yet
another emergency physician apparent authority claim. 75 The emergency
physician was employed by a practice group which contracted with the
hospital.76 The court found no actual agency relationship between the
physician and the hospital and, therefore, the inapplicability of respondeat

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Sztorc, 496 N.E.2d at 1202.
Id.
App. Ct. 1986).
498 N.E.2d 867 (I11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 872.
513 N.E.2d 149, 151-52 (111. App. Ct. 1987).
Id. at 151.
Id.
Greene, 498 N.E.2d at 871.
App. Ct. 1988).
522 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ill.
Id. at 702.
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superior.77 However, the court, citing Sztorc, held that apparent authority

was an appropriate issue for the jury.78
It is interesting that the Illinois Supreme Court relied, in part, on a
Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion, Pamperin v. Trinity Memorial
80
Hospital,79 to support its application of apparent authority in Gilbert.
Pamperin concerned an apparent authority claim based upon the alleged
negligence of a radiologist.8 1 The Pamperin court was much more
concerned about the need to join respondeat superior and apparent
authority to impose vicarious liability upon the hospital. The court found
that the hospital did not exercise control over radiological services.8 ' The
radiology group which employed the radiologist, maintained its own
offices, was responsible for billing for professional services, established
fees, provided its own professional liability insurance and could provide
services to other hospitals. 83 The Pamperin court found there was no
master-servant relationship between the hospital and the radiologist. 84 The
court, therefore, would not apply respondeat superior but applied apparent
authority as "consistent with this concept of the modern-day hospital
facilities. ''85 The Gilbert court really never addressed respondeat superior
in any detail and, presumably, disregarded it.86 In this fashion, the Gilbert
court used apparent authority to create a fictitious agency relationship and
to ignore or excuse respondeat superior as a doctrine to support the
87
hospital's vicarious liability.
Four Illinois Supreme Court opinions purport to constitute the
building blocks of Gilbert. These opinions are State Security Insurance
Co. v. Burgos,88 Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville,89 Faber9° and
Musser Co. v. William E. Dee Clay Manufacturing Co.,
Union StockYard & Transit Co. v. Mallory, Son & Zimmerman Co.9' The challenge is
to determine if these opinions really support the application of apparent

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 705.
423 N.W.2d 848 (Wis. 1988).
622 N.E.2d 788.
Pamperin,423 N.W.2d at 849.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 853.
Id.
Id. at 855.
622 N.E.2d 788.
Id. at 795.
583 N.E.2d 547 (II1. 1991).
412 N.E.2d 447 (I11.
1980).
126 N.E. 186 (II1. 1920).
41 N.E. 888 (111.1895).
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authority to medical negligence committed by non-agent physicians
occurring on hospital premises.
Regrettably, but not surprisingly, the aforementioned opinions do not
provide any guidance or insight as to why the Illinois Supreme Court in
Gilbert opted to recognize apparent authority in a healthcare context. In
State Security Insurance Co., the court considered the question of whether
an insurance broker is an agent or apparent agent of an insurance company
regarding the authority to accept notice of a claim.92 In Lynch, the court
concluded that teachers were acting with the appearance of authority
granted by the school board when coaching a powder puff football game in
which plaintiff was injured. 93 In Faber-Musser Co., the court considered
apparent authority in the commercial context of a contract claim for
damages based on the failure to deliver fire brick. 94 Finally, in Union
Stock-Yard & Transit Co., the court considered a trover action in
connection with conversion of cattle.95 The court's reference to apparent
authority related to commercial transactions.96
These cases are not particularly compelling reasons to apply apparent
authority in the healthcare setting. Also not compelling is the court's
comment, without citation, that "we conclude Illinois case law sufficiently
recognizes the realities of modem hospital care and defines the limits of a
hospital's liability. 97 The Gilbert court essentially created this case law.
Was the use of apparent authority the best approach for the Illinois
Supreme Court to utilize in order to recognize that a hospital might be
vicariously liable for the negligence of a non-agent physician committed on
the hospital premises? Perhaps not. This question can be re-examined after
Gilbert
an examination of the Illinois Supreme Court's extension of the
Plan.98
principles to the HMO context in Petrovich v. Share Health
In Petrovich, the court considered whether an HMO can be
vicariously liable for the negligence committed by a non-agent physician
who provided healthcare services through an HMO. 99 As with Gilbert, the
basic facts are not complicated. Plaintiffs employer provided healthcare to
its employees through an HMO.' ° The employees were enrolled in the

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

State Sec. Ins. Co., 622 N.E.2d at 550.
Lynch, 412 N.E.2d at 456.
Faber-MusserCo., 126 N.E. at 187.
Union Stock Yard & Transit Co., 41 N.E. at 891.
Id. at 892-93.
Gilbert, 622 N.E.2d at 795.
1999).
719 N.E.2d 756 (I11.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 760.
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HMO. 1° 1 For an employee to qualify for HMO healthcare, the employee
must choose a physician from a list of participating physicians.10 2 The
physician chosen by plaintiff was employed by a medical center satellite
facility.' 3' This facility contracted with the HMO to provide medical care
to HMO members. 104 The HMO in Petrovich was an independent practice
association (IPA) model. 105 This model contemplates that the HMO
contracts with a physician organization, which contracts with individual
physicians. In short, the HMO in Petrovich did not employ the chosen
physician.10 6 The physician was not an agent of the HMO.
In Petrovich,'°7 plaintiff claimed that physicians who rendered care to
her through the HMO were negligent in failing to diagnose cancer.'0 8 She
also claimed that the HMO should be vicariously liable for this negligence
under agency principles.'0 9
The other operative facts concern the HMO's "communication" to its
members through a member handbook." 0 The handbook did not identify
the employment status of the HMO physicians."' It referred to them as
"Share physicians," "your Share physician" and "our staff." It also
characterized Share as "your health care manager," "a good partner in
sickness and health," and stated that "Share would provide all healthcare
needs."" 2
The Illinois Supreme Court in Petrovich, following its decision in
Gilbert, held that apparent authority can be used to impose vicarious
liability on HMOs."' Curiously, the court pronounced, without citation:
"The principle that organizations are accountable for their tortious actions
and those of their agents is fundamental to our justice system."' ' 4 This
pronouncement is simply not an accurate statement of law. Organizations
or principals may be vicariously liable for the negligent torts committed by
their servant agents within the course and scope of employment." 5 The

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 760-61.
Id. at 761.
Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 761.
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 762-63.
Id.
Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 760.
Id.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 762.
Id.
Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 766.
Id. at 764.
SEAVY, supra note 9, Ch. III § 83.
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supreme court apparently desired that we overlook the fundamentals of
respondeat superior, as it held in Gilbert.1"6 Of course, even if a physician
was directly employed by an HMO, the physician would seem more like an
independent contractor agent than a servant agent due to the level of skill
and expertise possessed by the physician as well as the need to exercise
judgment in caring for patients. Consequently, the classic respondeat
superior approach does not fit well in the HMO scenario.
More telling is-the economic basis of Petrovich.117 The supreme court
stated, "Moreover, HMO accountability is essential to counterbalance the
HMO goal of cost-containment. To the extent that HMOs are profitmaking entities, accountability is also needed to counterbalance the
''1
inherent drive to achieve a large and ever-increasing profit margin.
This statement undoubtedly provides the true motive of Petrovich. If the
physician group is compensated by the HMO on an annual basis to provide
healthcare, the less healthcare provided to a patient population will
theoretically yield a higher profit to the physician group. If the supreme
court viewed cost-containment as a device by which to deny healthcare, the
court might desire to impose vicarious liability upon the HMO as a semipunitive, economic measure.
The supreme court in Petrovich had no trouble dealing with the
holding out and justifiable reliance elements of apparent authority. 1 9 If the
HMO holds itself out as providing care without informing patients that it
satisfied. 20 The language of
does not do so, the holding out requirement is 121
the member handbook fulfills this requirement.
The justifiable reliance element is built into the HMO process. This
element is satisfied by the employee having no choice but to enroll with the
provided health plan. If the employee chooses a non-health plan physician,
the HIMO does not cover the medical costs. Essentially, the patient has no
"choice"
choice at all. The act of enrolling in the HMO with the attendant
reliance.122
of a physician within the plan constitutes justifiable

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

622 N.E.2d at 795.
719 N.E.2d at 764.
Id.
See generally id. at 766.
Id.
Id. at 768.
Petrovich, 719 N.E.2d at 768-69.
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VI. SPECIAL PROBLEMS

A. RELIANCE

When, under Gilbert, does the patient not fulfill the justifiable reliance
requirement of apparent authority? Should a consumer-patient, unlikely
ever to know the precise relationship between physician and hospital, have
a realistic obstacle to hurdle insofar as this requirement is concerned?
Initially, it is noteworthy that Gilbert is not thought to limit the
apparent authority-hospital scenario to emergency room care.123 In fact,
the vicarious liability of the hospital might exist even if the medical
negligence did not occur in the hospital proper, but at an "affiliated"
location. 124 Even an intentional tort can constitute the basis for hospital
vicarious liability. 125 Justifiable reliance can, in any event, constitute a
formidable problem.
Consider the following issues regarding the justifiable reliance on the
"holding out" requirement:
Can the patient justifiably rely only if the patient is
conscious while treated? Can an unconscious patient rely
upon anything at all?
- Can the patient justifiably rely if there is no choice of
hospital to be made?
- Can the patient justifiably rely on the holding out of'
physicians whom the patient never sees, such as a
radiologist, a pathologist or other physician-consultant?
- Upon what, precisely, is the patient relying? Is reliance
necessary to "lure" the patient to the hospital in the first
instance? What reliance exists if the patient has no choice
but to go to a specific hospital?
-

In Butkiewicz v. Loyola University Medical Center, a patient was
directed
to aadvice.'
hospital27 by his primary physician. 26 The patient followed his
physician's
Therefore, the appellate court held that a radiologist

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Malanowski v. Jabamoni, 688 N.E.2d 732, 737 (Ili. App. Ct. 1997).
Id.
Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
724 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
Id.
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who allegedly misinterpreted an x-ray was not the apparent agent of the
hospital. 2 8 The patient's decision to enter the hospital was not due to a
desire to receive treatment from the hospital. 29 The patient was conscious
and relied upon his primary care physician's advice to enter the hospital. 30
In James v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, a patient entered a hospital
because she was a public aid recipient and believed she was required to go
to that hospital for care.13' She testified that she would have gone to the
if she knew that her physician was not an employee of the
hospital even
32
hospital.
In Monti v. Silver Cross Hospital, the appellate court considered the
case of an unconscious patient receiving hospital care.' 33 The court held
that apparent agency could apply despite the patient's inability to decide
which hospital to attend. 34 Essentially, the court reasoned that persons
responsible to help the patient obtain emergency care relied on the hospital
to provide this care.135 The Monti court did not desire to exclude
authority to hold a hospital
unconscious patients from using apparent
36
vicariously liable for medical negligence.'
Of course, the "reasoning" in Monti further contorts the concept of
apparent authority.'3 7 There simply cannot be any patient reliance when
the patient is unconscious; there is no state of mind. That others may
"rely" on the hospital by taking a patient to an emergency room is of no
moment. There is either a reliance element or there is not. Monti'38 is a
perfect example of how a contorted theory is easy to further contort by
merely excusing proof of an element of the cause of action.
Under Illinois law, actual reliance on the apparent agency seems to be
required. 139 How, then, should a court consider the following situation:
Mother takes baby to Hospital A emergency room where child receives
care. Mother is advised that child needs admission to intensive care unit,
but there are no beds available in Hospital A. Attending physician at

Id. at 1041.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
701 N.E.2d 207, 211-12 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
131.
Id. at 212.
132.
637 N.E.2d 427, 428 (I1. App. Ct. 1994).
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
136.
Id.
Id.
137.
637 N.E.2d 427.
138.
O'Banner v. McDonald's Corp., 670 N.E.2d 632, 634 (I11.1996) (citing Gilbert
139.
v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 795 (Ill. 1996)).
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Hospital A tells mother the child will be transferred to Hospital B, which is
affiliated with Hospital A. Child is transferred and receives care at
Hospital B, where medical negligence allegedly occurs. Is there a viable
claim against Hospital B under an apparent authority theory? Mother
clearly did not rely upon a holding out by Hospital B of physicians in
deciding to transfer her child from Hospital A to Hospital B. The child was
already at Hospital B when the allegedly negligent care was given. Should
mother be able to "rely" on all care as administered by Hospital B, as an
afterthought, since she was not lured to Hospital B by any "holding out" to
her as a potential consumer or patient?
B. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPARENT AGENCY

As previously discussed, the reliance issues in apparent agency and
healthcare can be complicated. The Illinois Civil Pattern Jury Instructions
105.10140 and 105.1 1141 require proof that the patient relied upon the
"apparent principal" to provide certain care. Is this the same reliance as
that discussed in Butkiewicz 142 and Jamess43 and required by O'Banner?144
Does reliance exist to lure the patient to the hospital or to convince the
patient that the hospital is providing all care once the patient has arrived at
the hospital? Are these instructions subject to modification if the patient is
not able to form the state of mind necessary to establish reliance?
C. APPARENT AUTHORITY AND OFF PREMISES HEALTH CARE

Malanowski145 suggests that Gilbert14' did not limit apparent authority
to medical negligence committed within the hospital premises. If a patient
sees a private physician, not recommended by a hospital, not provided
through an HMO, at a non-hospital facility which bears the hospital name,
is the hospital subject to vicarious liability based upon apparent authority?
If the private physician's group uses a name which incorporates the name
or a portion of the name of a hospital, should the hospital subject itself to

140.
126 ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES,
ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL No. 105.10 (3d ed. 1995).
141.
126 ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES,
ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL No. 105.11 (3d ed. 1995).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

724 N.E.2d at 1040-1042.
701N.E.2d at 211-12.
670 N.E.2d at 634-35.
688 N.E.2d at 737.
622 N.E.2d 788.
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vicarious liability based upon apparent authority? If there is a purpose to
apparent authority in healthcare, is the purpose achieved by imposing
vicarious liability upon a hospital when care is not provided at a hospital?
VII. DOES APPARENT AUTHORITY WORK IN A HEALTH CARE CONTEXT
WITH CLASSIC AGENCY PRINCIPLES?

Whether hospitals and HMOs should be subject to vicarious liability
for the negligence of non-agent, non-employed healthcare providers is a
subject for fair debate. Hospitals compete for healthcare dollars and this
competition includes efforts to influence consumers to seek hospital
services. It has been argued that vicarious liability is necessary in the
managed care context47 as an attention-getting device and as an incentive to
facilitate better care.'
The problem, however, with the use in healthcare of the classic
doctrine of apparent authority is that the doctrine is simply not a good fit.
Remember, the use of apparent authority is only part of the classical
vicarious liability process. Apparent authority is used to create an agency
relationship where there is none. Vicarious liability for the negligence
committed by an agent classically is based upon a master-servant agency
relationship. Negligent torts committed by a servant within the course and
scope of employment are imputed to the master. Physicians do not seem to
qualify as servant agents even if they were compensated by hospitals. They
occupy positions of skill, judgment and discretion. They are not subject to
the right of control which characterizes a master-servant relationship.
The reason that apparent authority as an agency principle does not fit
well with the debate over vicarious liability of hospitals and HMOs is that
agency law has its roots in commercial transactions. In fact, Mechem, long
of society in which
ago, stated that agency "belongs to a condition
148
developed."'
highly
are
transactions
commercial
Why must the Illinois courts contort classic agency principles to effect
policy decisions requiring hospitals and HMOs to vicariously answer for
medical negligence? In a teaching context, Gilbert149 and Petrovich50 are
difficult to explain. Should the student merely accept the position that
apparent authority has always been a part of Illinois law? Should the

See Clark C. Havinghurst, VicariousLiability: RelocatingRespoisibilityforthe
147.
Quality ofMedical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED.7 (2000).
MECHEM, supra note 10, Ch. I § 10.
148.
149.
622 N.E.2d 788.
150.
719 N.E.2d 756.
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student read the cases cited by the court to support these decisions or
merely faithfully assume that there is case support? Should the student
question pronouncements which seem to articulate well known legal
principles but which are not followed by any citation of authority?
Instead of trying to squeeze apparent authority into healthcare like a
shoe that does not fit, the Illinois Supreme Court could have applied a
vicarious liability doctrine on a policy basis, driven by economic
considerations.
This would have provided students and the legal
community with a modem, relevant approach to a legal issue. Instead, we
" ' which have,
are left with two significant Illinois Supreme Court opinions15
regrettably, misused agency principles, and which are difficult to apply in
practice.

151.
See supra notes 1 and 2; see also Burger v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 759 N.E.2d
533, 552, 557 (Ill. 2001) (recognizing Illinois Supreme Court's earlier references to
Petrovich, Gilbertand Pamperin.) Id.
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